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THE OMARSKA TRIAL-A WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL CLOSE-UP
PatriciaMcGowan Wald*

I.

THE EXPOSURE

N early August 1992, in the second year of the Bosnian war, Roy
Gutman, a Newsday reporter, stunned the world with a series of terrifying revelations about thousands of Muslim civilian men and women
herded into Serb-run "death camps" in Northern Bosnia. "According to
former detainees, the killing went on almost everywhere."' One of these
camps, Omarska, a hastily-converted mining complex with open pits and
huge hangar-like buildings, housed up to 1,000 men while another thousand "had to lie on their bellies" on the tarmac outside. 2 Armed guards
ordered excruciating tortures of their civilian prisoners, forcing them to
castrate other prisoners, engage in acts of cannibalism, and violate each
other. The prisoners received no medical help, were kept on starvation
diets, and allowed no visitors. "All the grass has been eaten by the people," Gutman wrote.3 When the camp closed down, 500 to 1,000 prison4
ers remained "missing" and were never subsequently accounted for.
The U.S. State Department's first reaction was skepticism as to
whether there was evidence to support Gutman's incendiary report.
When actual pictures of emaciated prisoners were produced, evoking immediate comparisons with the inmates of Nazi concentration camps a half
century earlier, U.S. officials labeled the war "a blood feud... a complex,
convoluted conflict that grew out of age-old animosities"; 5 no demand
was made at that time that the camps close down or that the Muslim
civilians be freed. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said CIA
sources knew of no systematic killings at the camp-only "unpleasant
conditions."' 6 Serb officials said there were no civilians, only captured
combat soldiers in the camps, but no visitors would be allowed inside
because the camp was in a "high risk zone."' 7 Gutman's reports continued, however, including one that "the International Red Cross has placed
* Former Judge for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and Former Chief Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court.
1. Roy GUTMAN, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE 90 (1993).

2. Id.

3. Id. at 93.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 101.
Id. at xxxi.
Id. at 92.
Id. at ix, 35.
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Omarska on a list of camps it intends to visit but has not yet formally
asked permission to do So.''8 Muslim sources told of children being impaled on spikes and electric drills used to bore into men's chests (though
such atrocities were never actually alleged at trial). Less lurid but more
plausible were reports that the camp had a large component of the entrepreneurial and cultural elite of the Muslim population in the region, at
least 10-15 of whom were taken out each night to a nearby lake and shot. 9
President Radovan Karadzic of the Autonomous Serb Republic in control of the region nevertheless said, "The Serbians energetically deny the
existence of camps for civilians anywhere in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." 10 At that point, the United Nations Security Council
demanded the prison camps in the region be opened for impartial international inspection.11 The Prime Minister of Yugoslavia retorted that
prison camps were being maintained by all sides in the Bosnian conflict,
and while he could not confirm or deny the existence of "death camps,"
he thought all the prison camps should be closed down. 12
The camp commander at Omarska, Zeljko Meakic, told reporters who
converged on the camp following Gutman's articles that only two men
died at Omarska, both of natural causes, and that there were never more
than 270 prisoners held at a time. By the time reporters were allowed
inside in late August, most prisoners had been transferred to other camps,
and bunks had been hurriedly brought in to simulate dormitories. 13 The
police chief, under whose authority the camp operated, insisted men had
been brought to Omarska only for interrogation and kept there for only a
few days, then either released, shipped off to prisoner-of-war camps elsewhere, or referred to prosecutors for criminal trials on war crimes
charges. 14 As late as October 2002, President Milosevic of Yugoslavia
was still denying at his own trial in the Hague that there were ever prison
camps on Serbian territory during the Bosnian war. 15 The camp was
closed down at the end of August 1992.16
II. THE INVESTIGATION
Shortly thereafter, the U.N. Security Council, in an attempt to react to
the international outrage that followed Gutman's articles, established a
Commission of Experts to look into-among other possible violations of
the law of war-conditions in the 333 Serbian-run prison camps scattered
8. Id. at 34.
9. Id. at 41, 44.
10. Id. at 54.
11. Id. at 61, 63.
12. Id. at 45.
13. Id. at 93-94.
14. Id. at 94.
15. Milosevic Challenges CroatianPresident,6 RFE/RL NEWSLINE 187, part 11, Oct. 3
2002, available at www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/4-see/see-031002.asp.
16. Gutman, supra note 1, at 91.
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throughout Bosnia. 17 As recounted by one of its principal authors and
investigators, it found:
" In the early years of the war, and particularly after Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia had declared their independence from the Yugoslavia nation to which they formerly belonged, Bosnian Serbs
pursued a strategy of trying to create a "Greater Serbia" by forming a corridor composed predominantly of Serbs which would
link Serbia with those parts of Bosnia and Croatia which were
heavily populated with Serbs. This strategy involved removing
non-Serbs-mostly Muslims-from the regions slated for inclusion in the "Greater Serbia." This "ethnic cleansing" often deteriorated into "unparalleled violence18and terror" targeted at the
non-Serb population in these areas.
" In the spring of 1992 heavy fighting broke out in the Prijedor
corridor of Northern and Eastern Bosnia in which Omarska is
located as the Serbs implemented their ethnic cleansing policy.
The typical pattern was for the Bosnian Serb army to shell a village with a substantial Muslim population, then send in paramilitary units to "cleanse" the town. Muslim houses and mosques
were burned and Muslim people herded into central holding
places. Permanent cleansing was then accomplished either by
forcibly relocating the Muslims elsewhere or by establishing
camps in which the men (and some women as well) would be
"interrogated," abused, starved, and often killed. The administration of the captured towns was taken over by the Serbs. 19
" Because the Bosnian Serb army was not strong or well organized
enough to transport all non-Serbs from captured territory, they
"relied on the use of terror which entailed mass killings, torture,
rapes and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population...
to ensure that non-Serbs would forsake the area and never return." They frequently used "rural, uneducated youth" operating
"outside any discernible centralized command and control structure" to conduct their "ethnic cleansing" campaigns and to help
run the camps.
The use of terror was "their most efficient
20
weapon.
* According to Bassiouni, "The camps appear to have played a significant role in 'ethnic cleansing' by provid[ing] central locations
to terrorize individuals and intimidate the entire target population." The camps were often set up in close-by clusters and21networks and prisoners were transferred freely between them.
17. FinalReport of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., vol. 4, Annex 8, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674
(1994) [hereinafter Security Council Report], reprintedin M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA app. I, at 65, 125 (1996).
18. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 17, at 33, 37-38, 46-47.

19. Id. at 34-35 nn.199 & 268; Security Council Report, supra note 17, Annex 6, paras.

110-113.
20. BASSIOUNI &

MANIKAS,

supra note 17, at 50-54; Security Council Report, supra

note 17, Annex 6, paras. 114-115.
21. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 17, at 59-61.

SMU LAW REVIEW
*

*

[Vol. 57

The Prijedor Corridor of Bosnia in which the Omarska camp was
located was 44% Muslim, 43% Serb, and 6% Croat. Simon
Drijaca, head of the Serbian party in Prijedor, was in charge of
three police stations, including the Omarska police station. Six
months before the takeover of Prijedor by the Serbs, he had begun building a Serbian police department and removing nonSerbs from all jobs involving law enforcement. Curfews were set
up, travel permits required of non-Serbs, and non-Serbs were required to hand over all weapons. Drljaca ordered the establishment of three internment camps: Omarska, Karaterm, and
Trnopolye. 22 The U.N. Report found "little to suggest a legitimate purpose for the internment of so many noncombatant civilians."' 23 It also found that "the similarity in structure of the
camps suggest a degree of preplanning before the war was
started." Large facilities adaptable to housing thousands appear
24
to have been selected and prepared before fighting began.
These camps in the Prijedor area-including Omarska-were the
most brutal in all of Bosnia; the Serbs exercised absolute control
over their captives. They needed the non-Serbs to be completely
subjugated or to 25
disappear if they were to attain their objective of
ethnic cleansing.
III.

THE TRIBUNAL

According to one of the U.N. Report's authors, "the discovery of the
prison camps ... focused the western public's attention on the [Bosnian]
conflict as never before. '26 The western democracies and the United
States were not yet willing to take a course of military intervention. As
an ameliorative measure, they established an international criminal court
to try the individual perpetrators of war crimes such as those that Gutman had put on center stage through his articles. Thus the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter "the Tribunal")
was established in 1993 by a United Nations Security Council Resolution
to prosecute and try individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia from
January 1, 1991 onward. 27 New Yorker reporter, Joseph Llelyveld, wrote:
The Hague Tribunal is the first truly international criminal court that
the world has seen. Nuremberg was a military tribunal under the
aegis of the occupying powers in Germany. The Israeli court that
tried Eichmann was a national court claiming jurisdiction on the basis of a principle of "universal jurisdiction" for crimes against humanity. The Hague Tribunal is an agency of the United Nations,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Security Council Report, supra note 17, Annex 5, paras. 131, 134, 146-152.
Id. Annex 8, para. 226.
Id. Annex 8, para. 251.
Id. Annex 8, para. 252.
BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 17, at 37.

27. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998).
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with a staff
of nearly twelve hundred, drawn from seventy seven
28
nations.
The establishment of the Tribunal was not, however, unanimously
lauded. Balkan officials labeled it "rigged justice." Other critics felt that
replaying the horrendous events of 1992-95 and assessing blame on particular individuals would do nothing to bring about reconciliation between warring ethnic groups but would only prolong old animosities.
Crimes of war, the critics argued, were different from ordinary crimes and
defied ordinary ethical and legal "assumptions about the nature of individual responsibility, the purposes of punishment, and the normal condi29
tions of human life" upon which a criminal court system is built.

In war and especially in civil wars, they asserted, an entire nation could
be regarded as criminal. "Millions of men and women [lose], for some
period of time, all recognition of the humanity of their victims, and even
of their own self-respect and humanity .... How can anyone start to as-

sign a specific amount of responsibility to each one . . .?30 Hannah Arendt, the chronicler of Nazi oppression 50 years beforehand, answered
these critics:
It seems to me... we have no tools in hand except legal ones with
which to judge and pass sentence on something that cannot even be
31
adequately represented either in legal terms or in political terms.
Gary Bass, a more recent war crimes commentator, echoed the same
theme:
Ultimately war crimes trials are the right choice, not because they
are too morally pure to be questioned, but because they are the least
bad of a number of bad choices before us. We should reject the only
alternatives-summary executions or ignoring the atrocities ....
There is no such thing as truly appropriate punishment for something
as hideous as the Srebrenica massacre, in which Serbian forces killed
some 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men ....Any situation in which there is
a need for a war crimes tribunal is a situation that has gone horribly
wrong. After atrocity all options are awful. War crimes tribunals are
simply-in
both moral and political terms-the least awful option we
32
have.
These quotes are simply particles of the much deeper debate about the
legitimacy and efficiency of war crimes tribunals and serve only to provide context for a discussion of the trial in which I participated of five
Bosnian Serbs indicted for operating the Omarska prison camp. Although the five and others at a higher level were indicted several years
earlier, their trials did not come up until late 1999. Trial Chamber I,
28. Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant, THE NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 85.
29. See Helena Cobban, The Legacies of Collective Violence, BOSTON REVIEW, Apr.-

May 2002, at 4.

30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Gary Bass, War Crimes and Punishment: Tribunals are Flawed, but not Futile,

WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2000, at B03.
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which began its joint trial in March 2000, comprised three trial judges:
Judge Fouad Riad of Egypt, Judge Almiro Rodrigues of Portugal, and
33
myself.
Here I digress to describe briefly how criminal trials are run at the
Tribunal. The judges, now numbering 16, are nominated by their respective countries but elected by the United Nations General Assembly for
four-year terms. No more than one judge can come from any one country. The judges are assigned to one of three three-member Trial Chambers or to the seven-member Appeals Chamber.
The working languages of the court are French and English, and all
judges and Chambers staff are expected to speak and write at least one of
them but not necessarily both fluently. Thus in Chamber I, two of the
three judges spoke French primarily along with most of the staff; I was
fluent in English only; it is self-evident that it takes much time and effort
to deliberate usefully and to issue an authoritative decision that truly reflects the views of all judges in those circumstances. Even when no real
substantive differences were involved among the judges, it remained a
special problem to produce hundred-page-or-more judgments that all
three of us were comfortable with.
Typically trials at the Tribunal last a year or longer; several have gone
on for two years. Everyone in the courtroom-defendants, counsel, prosecutors, judges-has access to simulcast translations in three languagesFrench, English, and Bosnian/Croat-Serb-and accompanying video transcripts. But under the imperative of continuous translation, sharp-paced
question and answer dialogues among prosecutors, witnesses, defense
counsel, and judges are impossible and trials are greatly lengthened. A
witness is interrogated by an English-speaking prosecutor, the question is
translated into Serb-Croat, and the answer then translated back into English. The entire dialogue may then have to be translated into French for
one or more of the judges. Witnesses come from a dozen countries and
their scheduling frequently engenders further delay. Prosecutors often
indict only after five years of field investigations and are understandably
reluctant to withhold from the court any piece of evidence they think
relevant. Defense counsel may be unfamiliar with the procedures of the
Tribunal-very different from their national systems-and their questioning, arguments, and objections consequently are attenuated; some have
never previously engaged in cross-examination, a talent which is only
slowly acquired. Many defendants, including four out of five of the
Omarska accused, spent two years or more awaiting trial in the U.N. detention unit on the outskirts of the Hague. Some judges have been assigned to preside over complex trials with no prior courtroom experience,
which can be an excruciating process.
The Tribunal makes its own rules and has changed them continually
over the years. They provide basically for an adversarial trial. Although
33. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, para. 768 (Nov. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/kvocka/trialc/judgement/kvo-tjOl lOO2e.pdf.
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there is no grand jury, a judge must confirm the indictment to assure that
there is evidence to support the charges prima facie. After a pretrial period, in which motions to dismiss, to sever, of special pleas of insanity, or
of diminished responsibility are made and judicial efforts are exerted to
limit the areas of dispute, reduce the number of witnesses, and set the
approximate length of trial, the prosecution puts on its case-in-chief. The
defense then puts on its case; the prosecution has an opportunity for rebuttal; the defense for surrebuttal; and the case is submitted for judgment. The court's deliberations may take weeks or even months. Guilt
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, but requires the consensus of
only two of the three judges. The sentence is entered at the time of verdict. Both the defendant and the prosecutor may appeal the verdict and/
or sentence to the Appeals Chamber.
Article 20 of the Tribunal Statute contains the rights of the accused and
follows the lines of the European Convention on Human Rights; the accused has the right to be notified in his own language of the charges
against him; to appointed counsel if he is indigent; to be present at trial;
not to incriminate himself; to be brought to trial within a reasonable time;
to examine the witnesses against him; to put on his defense; and to be
informed of any evidence in the hands of the prosecutor that tends to
show his innocence 34or mitigate his guilt or impugn the credibility of a
prosecution witness.
The Tribunal is now in its tenth year and is expected to finish its last
trial at the end of the decade and its last appeal a few years later. The
New Yorker article to which I referred earlier rendered this evaluation of
its performance to date:
The early indictments were notable for their vagueness, not to mention the relative insignificance of those who were indicted. The early
judgments were long and, not infrequently, loosely reasoned. More
recently the Tribunal has managed to put together a respectable record: twenty seven people have so far been convicted and five have
been found not guilty.... It is running six trials at once. It has set its
own judicial precedents and tightened some of its procedures, and it
now functions, like an established institution, in a hermetic, securityconscious world of its own. Among staff members, human-rights advocates, and some students of international law, there is hope, approaching pious faith, that the Tribunal is doing more than righting
Balkan wrongs. Its real work, in this view, is to secure the foundacrimes
tion of an international jurisprudence on war crimes and
35
against humanity which can be brought to bear globally.

34. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm#24 [hereinafter ICTY Statute];
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence IT/32/Rev. 21 (July 2001) [hereinafter ICTY
Rules]. On the workings of the ICTY, see EssAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
(Richard May et al. eds., 2000).
35. Lelyveld, supra note 28, at 86.
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THE DEFENDANTS-"LITTLE FISH"

But significant issues about the Tribunal's mission continue. There has,
for example, been controversy, almost from the beginning, about the legitimacy and wisdom of indicting and trying "little fish" for war crimes
while the "big fish"-the principal military and civic leaders who planned
and strategized the worst of the war crimes-continue to walk free because the governments of the countries where they reside will not turn
them over and the Tribunal has no police force of its own to go after
them. This issue was present at the Omarska trial-none of the five defendants in that trial-all Bosnian Serbs-was a top-level military or civic
official in the region or even at the camp itself. The lead defendant,
Miroslav Kvocka, had been a patrol leader in the police station in the
town of Omarska, a de facto deputy to the Omarska Police Chief, Zeljko
Meajic, who became the commandant of the camp and who in turn served
under the command of the Chief of Public Security, Simon Drjlaca, in the
region where Omarska was located; Drjlaca had signed the order establishing the three prison camps. Neither of the latter two officials, though
indicted, was involved in the Omarska trial of the five guards on which I
sat in 2000-2001; Drjlaca killed himself in the course of being apprehended, and Meajic was not captured until a few months ago. Kvocka
claimed throughout the Omarska trial that he was simply an aide to the
Police Chief with no independent authority to order other guards around
or to change conditions at the camp. 36 No persuasive evidence was
shown at trial that he personally mistreated any prisoners, and there was
some evidence that he tried to deflect other guards' abuses of prisoners
on at least a few occasions. 37 Nonetheless, the court ultimately found
Kvocka had "some degree of authority over the guards" and was "the
functional equivalent of deputy commander," though whatever degree of
authority he possessed pertained only to security; no one suggested he
had any ability to order changes in the foul conditions in which the pris38
oners were kept or to order their release.
Kvocka freely admitted that he knew the detainees were being mistreated by other guards and that the food and sanitary conditions were
"below an acceptable level."'39 He saw dead bodies piled up, men lying
unmoving on the tarmac exposed to the elements, he heard from inmates
and other guards the stories of men beaten on their way to the toilet and
dragged out at night for abuse by undisciplined and untrained guards. He
said he reported these events to the camp Commander, who said nothing
could be done. Still Kvocka did not willingly leave his job-he was removed from the camp command after only seventeen days because of his
efforts to aid his two incarcerated Muslim brothers-in-law to escape. He
said on the stand that given the chance he would have remained in his
36.
37.
38.
39.

Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 330-386.
Id. paras. 395, 397 nn.678 & 386-396.
Id. para. 372.
Id. para. 375.
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40
post until the camp closed.
Dragoijub Prcac was a sixty-three year old retired reserve police officer
with two disabled children, called back to service during the war. The
prosecution had originally claimed that he replaced Kvocka as Deputy
Commander but the evidence at trial sustained only a finding that he was
a kind of administrative aide, a paper pusher at the camp who "called out
names" of prisoners for interrogations or transfers and seemingly had
some authority to decide in which building they would be housed. There
were no substantiated allegations he either personally abused prisoners
or ordered their abuse by others. He worked at the camp only twentytwo days. Prcac claimed he didn't want to serve at Omarska at all but did
so only under "duress"-the Head of Public Security threatened him and
his family if he refused-a claim the trial court did not ultimately accept.
The evidence mainly showed that he walked around the camp doing his
administrative chores in full view of the dead bodies piled up and the men
lying face down on the tarmac. His office was located so that he could
hear the cries of prisoners beaten during interrogations, and he could see
their bloody and broken bodies as they emerged. He could also see prisoners beaten on their way to being fed and, because he arranged the assignment of prisoners to buildings, he knew firsthand the filth and
crowded conditions in which they lived. One of the victim witnesses said
Prcac called names of women out at night for other guards to sexually
abuse; another woman, however, testified that without his help she would
not have survived the camp. 41 The court concluded he had "some influ'4 2
ence in the camp" due to his position as an "administrative aide."

Milojca Kos, the third defendant, was a younger, poorly educated former waiter drafted into the police reserve, one of three guard shift commanders at Omarska who stayed the 36-day course from the opening to
the closing of the camp. Several prisoner witnesses said his shifts were
the least abusive; one incident, however, implicated him personally in extortion of money and there was evidence that guards on his shift some43
times beat prisoners in his presence.
Mlado Radic, the fourth defendant, was also a shift commander but he
differed from Kvocka, Prcac, and Kos in that there was stronger and
much greater evidence involving him personally with prisoner abuse.
Prisoners testified that his was the most dreaded of shifts-more prisoners were beaten and killed than on any other shift, and the guards that
served under him were the most brutal and uncontrolled. Radic was also
personally charged with rape and sexual offenses against female prisoners
44
in the camp.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

paras.
paras.
paras.
paras.
paras.

374-85, 399.
422-424.
438, 439.
472-489, 490-496.
506-561.
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The fifth defendant, Zoran Zigic, was indisputably shown to have committed heinous acts against Muslim prisoners. He was not a guard at
Omarska; yet, because of close connections with influential Serbs he was
allowed to enter the camp at will and to torture prisoners. He forced
prisoners to crawl like animals, beat them, then made them wash their
bloody faces in puddles of muddy water. A few prisoners tried to commit
45
suicide rather than face his assaults.
V.

THE TRIAL

These, then, were the five defendants brought to the International
Criminal Court at The Hague to be tried on charges of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Essentially, the Omarska trial turned on what
law was to be applied to the conduct of these five accused; there was no
significant dispute at trial about the horror of life at Omarska. Indeed,
the defendants stipulated to the deplorable conditions in the camp, conditions which had already been amply documented in an earlier trial of
Dusco Tadic, an abusive companion of Zoran Zigic, who had also tortured and killed inmates in the camp. 46 The prosecution, for obvious reasons, however, wanted to take full advantage of the shock effect of the
live testimony from victim witnesses about the hellish conditions in the
camp: 139 witnesses appeared personally; nearly 500 exhibits were introduced; and the trial consumed 113 days. 47 The principal defense of all
accused, except Zigic, was that in the anarchic camp hierarchy they had
no control over anyone else's behavior; they neither committed abuses
personally nor ordered others to do so; and they performed assigned
guard or administrative duties in a proper manner. Indeed, the Trial
Chamber ultimately found that "none of the accused was instrumental in
establishing the camps or determining official policies practiced on the
detainees therein. '48 So the critical question was a legal one: on what
recognized theory of international law could these camp functionaries be
held liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity based on inhumane treatment of civilians in detention?
Given that the quality and quantity of food and water, medical services,
and even facility maintenance were controlled by authorities outside the
camp; that the dreaded interrogations were conducted by outside security
police who came and went every day; and that the guards, including the
45. Id. paras. 581-511. Zigic was convicted of even more vicious crimes against prisoners at the nearby Keraterm camp where he did serve as a guard for a brief period. Simultaneously with the Omarska trial, trials were being conducted of several camp officials from
the Keraterm camp which operated in close proximity to Omarska in an abandoned ceramics factory. The Keraterm trial ended in guilty pleas to a single count of persecution for
which the shift leaders who had not engaged in any personal abuse and who had tried to
minimize the abuse of others were sentenced to prison within the three to seven year
range. The commander for six weeks who had himself committed a murder received ten to
seventeen years. Id. para. 710 n.1181.
46. Id. para. 790.
47. Id. paras. 768, 796, 798.
48. Id. para. 4.
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defendants, were basically responsible only for the security of the inmates, i.e., not letting them escape and had no power to release prisoners,
49
was the record here sufficient to hold the five accused as war criminals?
Even if as the Trial Chamber ultimately found, Omarska breathed an "atmosphere of sweeping impunity and consuming terror" 50 run by anarchistic and untrained guards-often intoxicated. According to one detainee,
"When they were feeling bored, they would just lash out at you for no
reason at all." 5 1 But, was the mere status of being a guard supervisor or
administrative aide enough to qualify a man as a perpetrator of a war
crime or a crime against humanity? Was there a viable legal theory or
precedent in international law to support such convictions? The defendants were charged in the indictment with crimes against humanity (persecution and inhumane acts) and with crimes against the law and customs
of war (outrages upon personal dignity). Under either charge, murder,
confinement in inhumane conditions, torture, beating, and sexual abuse
would meet5 2 the standards if these acts could be attributed to these
defendants.
The Tribunal statute defined as criminally liable anyone who planned,
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, perpetration, or execution of a war crime or crime against humanity. 53 An
earlier Tribunal decision in the Tadic case had included within the term
"committing," "those modes of participating in the commission of crimes
which occur where several persons having a common criminal purpose
embark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by
some member of this plurality of persons. ' '54 A variant of this theory had
been used in the Nuremberg cases to impose liability on persons at all
levels who knowingly participated in the operation of the "death
camps."'55 The Omarska court now took that "death camp" theory and
extended it to the facts in the case before it. It is a theory not dissimilar
from our homegrown criminal conspiracy theory, but not one frequently
used outside the continental United States. Indeed, the common purpose
or criminal enterprise doctrine, as it has come to be called, had not been
specifically charged in the Omarska indictment at all, though the court
found that language in an earlier case and the facts pleaded in this one
put the defense on notice that such a theory might be employed. 56 The
defense argued persistently, nonetheless, that it was wrong to proceed on
49. Id. paras. 28-39.
50. Id. para. 43.

51. Id.
52. Id. paras. 119, 200. The crime of persecution requires proof that the prohibited
acts were committed with an intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds

(in this case being non-Serbs).
53. ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 7; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T,
para. 240 (Nov. 2, 2001).
54. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 190 (ICTY July 15, 1999), available

at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealljudgement/index.htm.
55. The Nuremberg precedents are discussed at length in Prosecutor v. Krocka, Case
No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 268-306 (Nov. 2, 2001).
56. Id. paras. 245-248.
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a theory not specifically charged, an argument, I hasten to add, that they
have continued to argue on an appeal that is still pending.
The Omarska court went decidedly further than any prior decision in
applying this "criminal enterprise" theory. It decided that depending on
the level of participation of an accused in a criminal enterprise it was
possible to be either a co-perpetrator or, less culpably, an aider and abettor in that enterprise who could be held criminally liable for all the alleged acts of the other participants in the enterprise. The court held that
Omarska was a criminal enterprise designed to persecute Muslims and
that all five Omarska defendants were co-perpetrators in that
57
enterprise.
The court found support for its ruling in the Nuremberg prosecutions
that established that an accused could be a co-perpetrator of a criminal
enterprise if he joined up or participated in an ongoing operation even if
he was not involved in its original planning or design, so long as he knew
at the time of joining about the illegal purpose of the enterprise. Nuremberg prosecutions of participants in the Nazi concentration campsDachau, Belsen, and Mauthausen-had used the theory extensively, but
not always consistently. Some of the Nuremberg cases seemed to require
nothing more than passive inaction by camp workers, but most such cases
involved death camps where the annihilation of the inmates was notorious to everyone who worked there. And one strain of Nuremberg camp
cases suggested that if the accused had not personally participated in
criminal acts or ordered them, he must be shown to have had the requisite authority to change abusive conditions; if he were merely a guard or
prison functionary, he must be shown to have misused his camp position
to ill-treat the prisoners. 58 Thus Nuremberg precedent definitely left
some doubts as to whether mere participation as a guard in a non-death
camp-however pervasive the brutality and deprivation-was enough to
justify liability as an international war criminal.
The Omarska court opted for a middle ground between absolute guilt
for members of a camp staff and a need to prove active participation in
prisoner abuse. It said: "When a detention facility is operated in a manner which makes the discriminatory and prosecutory intent of the operation patently clear, anyone who knowingly participates in any significant
way in the operation of the facility or assists in facilitating its activity,
incurs individual criminal responsibility. . . ." Thus, "This does not mean
that anyone who works in a detention camp where conditions are abusive
57. Id. paras. 319, 408, 470, 504, 566, 610, 707.
58. Compare Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and 39 others, Geneva Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau, Germany, 15 November-13 December 1945,
in The United States War Crimes Commission, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, VOL. XI, p. 5, 1, and Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court,
Luneberg, 17 September-17 November 1945, The United States War Crimes Commission, 2
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, with United States v. Ohlenforf,4 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL

COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 373.
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automatically becomes liable as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. The participation must be significant... [But] a person with significant authority or influence who knowingly fails to complain or protest
automatically provides substantial assistance or support to criminal activity by their approving silence, particularly if present at the scene of criminal activity."'59 In deciding the threshold level for significant
participation, factors such as the size of the enterprise, the position of the
accused, the amount of time spent in the camp after learning of the criminal nature of the enterprise, efforts made to prevent criminal activity,
nature of the crimes committed, and any gratuitous cruelty shown by an
accused in performing his functions would be taken into account. 60 The
value of the criminal enterprise theory to the prosecution of a war crime
is obvious: If an accused is found to be a significant participant he can be
held responsible for crimes he may not even have known about which
were committed by other participants to further the purpose of the enterprise or foreseeable from the common purpose. The theory is being extensively employed at this moment in the Milosevic trial.
The court thus found all five defendants guilty of the war crimes and
crimes against humanity visited upon the hapless inmates of Omarska
during the time each defendant was there. The court first dismissed out
of hand the notion that anyone working there would not have known of
the brutal assaults and foul conditions-all but one admitted they did.
The court said they must also have known that the purpose of the assaults
was to intimidate and terrorize the inmates because they were non-Serbs
whose disappearance from the region was devoutly sought. This sufficed
to show the necessary discriminatory intent required under international
law for persecution as a crime against humanity:
Omarska was not a place where occasional random acts of cruelty
against inmates occurred or where living conditions were simply
hard. This was a hellish environment in which men and women were
deprived of the most basic needs for their survival and of their humanity .... Omarska was a place where beatings occurred daily and

with devilish instruments of torture. No one could mistake Omarska
for merely a badly run prison; it was a criminal enterprise designed
to operate6 1in a way that destroyed the mind, body, and spirit of its
prisoners.
But still there was the crucial question of whether these defendants' participation in the Omarsaka criminal enterprise was significant enough to
invoke criminal liability. While an accused's mere presence in the camp
might not be enough for guilt, that presence, "particularly when coupled
with a position of authority, is a probative, but not determinative, indication that an accused encouraged or supported the perpetration of the
59. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 306, 309.
60. Id. para. 311.
61. Id. para. 707.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

crime."'62 The higher the accused's position in the camp hierarchy the
more his tacit approval of misdeeds by others would contribute to carrying out the invidious purpose of the enterprise. Applying this principle to
the five defendants, the court found them all guilty as co-perpetrators 63 in
the running of the Omarska prison camp, itself a criminal enterprise:
[D]efendants were not . . .mere lowly cogs in the wheel of the
camp's operation. They were not janitors who swept the floors or
even cooks who served the meals. Their function was the raison d'
etre of the camp: to ensure that these thousands of men and dozens
of women remained captive in their deplorable surroundings, subject
to the whims of errant groups, opportunistic visitors, or the official
interrogators who came to abuse them. Without64their guarding function ...there could have been no camp at all.
According to the trial court, Kvocka's continued presence, even for only
seventeen days, "sent a message of approval to other participants in the
camp's operation, specifically guards in a subordinate position to him and
'65
was a condonation of the abuses and deplorable conditions there.
Whatever his actual role in the administration and functioning of the
camp he was widely perceived as the camp commandant's deputy and as
an experienced police officer. The prosecution sought a thirty-five-year
sentence; the court gave him seven years, half of which had already been
66
served awaiting trial.
What about Prcac, the wounded old man who seemed to do little more
than carry lists of prisoners and call out their names? Was this enough to
qualify him as a war criminal? The court found that despite the banal
62. Id. para. 257.
63. All five defendants were found to be co-perpetrators rather than aiders and abetters of the criminal enterprise. Under Tribunal jurisprudence an aider and abetter is one
who provides tangible assistance or active moral support to the perpetrator that has a substantial effect on the commission of the crime. He need only have the knowledge that his
acts may facilitate the commission of the crime, not necessarily an intent that the crime be
committed. See id. paras. 253-265. In the case of persecution, an aider or abetter must be
aware the crimes he assists or supports are being committed with a discriminatory intent.
Id. para. 262.
The Tadic case itself created some confusion by describing the "common purpose" theory as a "form of accomplice liability." And many of the Nuremberg cases did not differentiate between perpetrators and accomplices: suppliers of poison gas, those who drove
prisoners to their execution, guards who prevented would-be rescuers of the executed, custodians who arranged for a U.S. soldier to be handed over to Japanese soldiers knowing
they would kill him were found guilty of participating in a criminal enterprise. It was left
to their sentences to reflect different degrees of culpability. See id. paras. 273, 282, 283; see
also Kelly D. Askin, Omarska Camp, Bosnia, 30 HUM. RTS. 12, 14 (Winter 2003) ("[P]ostWorld War II case law usually concluded that whether aiders and abetters, accessories, or
principal organizers and perpetrators, anyone who knows that a crime is about to be committed and nonetheless performs the function required and facilitates the crime's commission, can be held liable.").
64. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, para. 706.
65. Id. para. 405.
66. Id. para. 708. On December 17, 2003, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY granted
provisional release pending appeal to Kvocka who by that time had served over 80% of his
sentence. Decision in the Request for Provisional Release of Miroslav Kvocka, Prosecutor
v. Kvocka, Case. No. IT-98-30/1-A (Dec. 17, 2003).
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nature of his duties Prcac occupied a position different from ordinary
guards: he walked unhindered about the camp; witnesses said he was
--calmly etticient" or "callously indifferent" even while witnessing abuses
by others; "his administrative duties constituted one of the many integral
cogs on the wheel of a system of gross mistreatment"; he had "some influence over guards. . ."; he was "responsible for the movement of detainees
within the camp"; his cardinal sin was "he remained impassive when
crimes were committed in his presence"; and "his silence can be regarded
as giving moral support or approval to the perpetrators." He received a
sentence of five years, taking into account his ill health and post-arrest
cooperation with the prosecutor. By the end of the trial he had already
67
served 19 months.
Kos and Radic were the shift commanders, one with the least, the other
with the most drastic reputation for tolerating cruelty by guards on their
shifts. The court found that the fact Kos stayed until the camp closed,
along with his authority as a shift commander to order other guards
around, was a "sufficient basis" on which to convict him. His job as shift
commander "was integral to the efficient and effective functioning of the
camp." It also credited the testimony of inmates that on one occasion he
spurred on other guards to beat prisoners who had to run the gauntlet to
get food.68 Kos received 6 years in prison, 3 1h of which he had already
served. 69 Parenthetically, 9 months after the sentence was handed down
in November 2001, Kos was released for good behavior, provoking outraged comments reported in one newspaper from victim advocates that
"the worst fears are now realized. Even the relatively lenient sentences
are only a fig leaf. . . . 'What were they [the judges] thinking' when they
handed down these sentences for concentration camp shift commanders
that would free them in 9 months ... [i]s this what all this vast effort, skill,
70
dedication, and funding went to accomplish?"
At the other end of the spectrum, the court found "a substantial
amount of credible and consistent evidence that a large number of crimes
were committed by guards on Radic's shift... and Radic ... never exercised his authority to stop the guards from committing such crimes ... his
failure to intervene gave the guards a strong message of approving of
their behavior. Given his position of authority over the guards, his nonintervention condoned, encouraged, and contributed to the crimes' commission and continuance. '7 1 Radic was additionally convicted of personal involvement in sexual crimes against the women in the camp and
received a sentence of 20 years.
Finally Zigic, the opportunistic abuser who did not even hold a camp
position but gratuitously imposed his own reign of terror as a random
67. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 438, 459, 460, 461, 462, 726.
68. Id. paras. 489, 490, 497.
69. Id. para. 735.
70. The Worst Fears About the ICTY are Confirmed, Posting of Michael Sells,
msells@haverford.edu, to just-watch-l@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu (July 31, 2002).
71. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, paras. 538, 745.
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night visitor to the camp was sentenced to 25 years. He was found to be a
co-perpetrator in the criminal enterprise, though he had no position of
authority.
Omarska functioned as a joint criminal enterprise and Zigic played a
significant role in perpetrating crimes . . . as part of that enterprise . . . . The Trial Chamber finds that Zigic's participation in
72
Omarska camp was significant.
I note again that appeals by all defendants are still pending.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS

What lessons can we draw from the Omarska case about international
norms of criminal liability and the legitimacy of international courts that
must apply those norms to the citizens of individual sovereign states?
The question is particularly apt as the new International Criminal Court
becomes operational.
First, I would affirm that those persons indicted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity who come before the Hague Tribunal receive a
fundamentally fair trial. Despite differences from our own system, such
as the absence of jury trials, the appealability of acquittals by the prosecution, and the less stringent rules against hearsay evidence, I never felt that
any defendant failed to receive his full due process-indeed the time consumed with insuring defense rights was more than adequate. 73 In some
ways the processes of the court could have been more efficient-and they
are improving with time and experience-but those managerial deficiencies did not detract from the fairness of the trials. I cannot, accordingly,
subscribe to the objections so frequently voiced against the new International Criminal Court that it would not accord due process to defendants
before it. Nor did I ever see indications of bias against any of the defendants by judges from other nations based on ethnic, racial, or religious
grounds. So, on balance, procedural fairness was not a problem in the
72. Id. paras. 610, 682, 684, 750.
73. A few interesting procedural sidelights on Zigic. He did not take the stand as a
witness, but under Tribunal Rules he was allowed to make an unsworn, uncross-examined
statement about the merits of the case, which he did. He also tried to plead an intoxication
defense, that he was addicted to alcohol and did things under its influence he would not

ordinarily do. The court rejected the legitimacy of an alcoholism defense for a persistent
pattern of violent abuse involving brutality and weapons.
Like the other four accused, Zigic had a self-chosen counsel paid for by the Tribunal

assisted at various times by nine defense team members. (Virtually all defendants ask for
and receive assigned counsel.) Subsequently, after the trial, the Registrar determined that
in fact Zigic had sufficient means to pay for his own counsel and withdrew the assignment
for purposes of the appeal. (The costs of the appeal were estimated to be $32,000.) His
current "substantial means" were acquired by cash transfers from members of his defense
team who in turn diverted monies from their compensation as assigned counsel. Two

apartments, a truck, and a commercial business were purchased with such revenues. Altogether, Zigic got $175,000 from his defense team. The Tribunal had spent, up to July 2002,
almost $1.5 million on his defense.
See Press Release, United Nations ICTY, Legal Aid to Accused Zoran Zigic Withdrawn
Following Completion of a Financial Investigation By the Registry (July 8, 2002), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p686-e.htm.

2004]

THE OMARSKA TRIAL

Omarska or any other trial I am aware of, including the Srebrenica massacre trial on which I also sat.
As to substance, international humanitarian law is a work in progress.
Except for the Nuremberg prosecutions fifty years ago and a few isolated
national prosecutions, there was almost a complete absence of judicial
precedent applying the various treaties and compacts and formulations of
customary international law as the basis of individual criminal liability at
the time the ICTY was set up. It was inevitable that the court had to
flesh out bare boned doctrines that had never or only fitfully been applied to individuals before. Indeed, that may be one of the Tribunal's
long-lasting legacies-it has resulted in a virtual explosion of concrete
applications of international law doctrines that had resided mainly in
treatises and in the halls of diplomacy. That law inevitably had to be
different from any one nation's law but yet had to encompass acceptable
norms of the civilized world.
The criminal enterprise doctrine that figured so prominently in the
Omarska trial is an example of this developing jurisprudence. It is not
only extremely useful, if not indispensable, in detention camp prosecutions, but, I believe, is conceptually valid. An entire operation may be
tainted or contaminated with an illegal purpose-in Omarska the purpose was to terrorize the Muslim inmates and reduce them to subhuman
status. That said, the criminal enterprise doctrine must have outer limits
if the notion of individual criminal guilt is to be maintained, rather than
replaced by notions of collective guilt which was, after all, the very evil
the Tribunals were set up to avoid. Nuremberg spawned the doctrine but
did not complete the refining process. I would hope that the continuing
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the evolution of the ICC can complete the
process.
The five accused in Kvocka have, I believe, been placed on the proper
side of the dividing line between legal culpability and mere passivity; the
Omarska accused had in varying degrees somewhat more authority than
ordinary guards; their knowledge of how the camp operated could not be
denied. Still some commentators might balk at the idea that a police officer ordered to duty at the camp as an administrative aide, who bears no
demonstrable ill will against the inmates, who does not participate in the
barbarities and remains there only briefly, should be held as a co-perpetrator of the criminal enterprise. Indeed, one moderate American judge
with whom I discussed the case on my return worried that when the
United States sets up a temporary prison camp in Afghanistan or Iraq or
Guantanamo and if assertions are made that prisoners are being mishandled on a widespread basis, the U.S. soldiers who acted as guards or supervisors could be brought before an international tribunal (if there were
one with jurisdiction) and charged with war crimes. Though at this point
theoretical, that scenario is not totally implausible. Even less theoretically, I have myself wondered whether the abuse of prisoners in some
U.S. prisons has not on occasion been so endemic and brutal that any
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guard (were ordinary guards to come within the sway of the doctrine)
could be found guilty of human rights violations of prisoners.
Although the Kvocka decision goes out of its way to distinguish the
case of a prison where abuses are "occasional," we all have come into
contact with prisons in our own country where abuse is longstanding,
rampant, and pervasive. Would it be enough in such places to implicate
all non-abusive guard supervisors who remain on the job with knowledge
of what is going on? Must they walk away from their jobs or turn in the
miscreants to higher authority to escape criminal liability? To take the
point even further, is the corporate employee who knows of but takes no
part in corporate wrongdoing harmful to investors criminally liable if she
does not become a whistleblower? The criminal enterprise doctrine is
being increasingly employed in international criminal courts where
crimes are committed in the context of military campaigns and prison
camps. But its future development and further extension must be carefully monitored.
Second, there are and will continue to be endless debates about the
nature of evil and whether international and internal civil conflicts inevitably demonize ordinary citizens into doing terrible deeds or tolerating
terrible deeds done by others which they would not countenance in ordinary times. Some say that full-scale criminal trials are not the answer for
such passive involvement and find preferable truth and reconciliation
commissions which require the people who merely executed or stood by
while the nefarious policies instituted by others were executed to hear the
victims' stories, to confront and respond to them, and eventually to do
community penance. The apparatus of criminal trials would then be reserved for the leaders who initiated these policies and assigned their implementation to underlings as did the commandant of Omarska and the
police chief who setup the camps. Indeed, some of the more recent hybrid tribunals set up in the wake of brutal civil wars like Sierra Leone
have announced that prosecutions will be limited to twenty to thirty of
the leaders, and the rest of the wrongdoers left to national courts or to
truth and reconciliation commissions. In Rwanda, indigenous tribal
courts-gacaca-have been established to drain off tens of thousands of
accused Hutus which the international court and the domestic courts in
Rwanda can never be expected to reach. But here again experience
shows that more informal tribunals can themselves
stray into abuse of
74
human rights and must be vigilantly watched.
More fundamentally, the level at which complicity with evil should be
legally sanctioned-as opposed to morally condemned-remains a dark
underside of international criminal law. A biography of the Nazi leader,
74. See, e.g., Council in Pakistan Orders Gang Rape, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A9
(tribal jury orders gang rape of 18-year-old girl as "punishment for brother's illicit affair");
Ginger Thompson, South African Commission Ends Its Work, INT'L N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2003, at A5 (Truth and Reconciliation Commission moves against blanket amnesty to perpetrators of apartheid); Cobban, supra note 29, at 8-11.
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Albert Speer, refers to the "lingering question of when, in any polity,
compliance with injustice turns into complicity" and stresses "how easily,
given appropriate conditions, people will allow themselves to be mobilized into violence, abandoning the humanitarian traditions they have
built up over centuries to protect themselves from each other. '75 We
have seen it in our own time-Chechnya, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda.
But then should we give up on the task of laying down rules for tolerated behavior in war? To do so consigns a century of slow progress beginning with the Hague and Geneva Conventions through the Genocide
Convention and ending with the permanent ICC to the ash heap of history. War itself may be madness, but-while it remains resistant to
cure-we must still deal with its cruel side effects, the brunt of which are
visited on women and children.
Third, the Yugoslav Tribunal has been criticized for focusing too much
of its resources on "little fish," as in Omarska, while the "big fish"-Serbian President Radovan Karadzic and Serbian Commander Ratko
Mladic-swim free. I have no doubt that had Karadzic and Mladic been
apprehended, the prosecutors would have leaped at the chance to try
them. 76 And the situation has improved of late. Slobodan Milosevicperhaps the biggest fish of all-is currently on trial as are other highlyplaced Serbian and Muslim generals and political leaders. While the
question persists whether if these leaders remain at large it is just to go
ahead and try the lesser functionaries, and while an observer of the
Omarska trial might well ask, would not the trial have been different if
Meakic-the acknowledged camp commander-had been there to weigh
in on the command structure among the guards in the camp, on whether
he did receive complaints from some of the defendants about prisoner
abuses, and on whether he reported abuse to his own higher ups, still
some ICTY veteran prosecutors object to that line of thought. In the
words of one ICTY prosecutor:
Talk of big fish and little fish implies that unless you are high on the
scale of authority, you are not worth going after and that's an
7 7 insult
to the person whose family was blown away by a little fish.
Others say that telling and retelling the terrible tales of these concentration camps-both the Nazi camps and the Bosnia ones-is vital for
history's sake: a precaution against future revisionists who claim such
75. Max Frankel, Hitler's Architect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at 14.
76. See Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of
the ICTY, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903, 906 (2003) (important to get lower-level physical
perpetrators in dock for surviving victims' sake).
77. Peter Ford, How to Prosecute a War Crime, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Mar. 13,
2000, at 6 (statement of Brenda Hollis); see also Ian Buruma, How Iraq Can Get Over Its
Past, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at 31. ("Getting rid of the top leaders is the easy part.
Those still alive can be taken care of by international tribunals .... The difficulty begins
with the middle ranks: the prison wardens, university professors, army officers and penpushers who carried out murderous orders. How far down the ranks should you go in
purging them? Should they be punished, or simply removed from public office?").
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events never took place and a cathartic
for the societies-especially the
78
victims-where they took place.
Yet even its ardent supporters admit that the Hague Tribunal has not
succeeded in changing the culture of the Balkan region. According to
one highly-placed former ICTY official:
It has made scant contribution to the prosecution of war crimes and
crimes against humanity-the pillars of its subject matter jurisdiction-in the courts of the states of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the
irony may be that despite the millions of dollars spent on building a
judicial infrastructure in the Hague, there is virtually no effective enforcement of these important laws in the courts
that ultimately mat79
ter most, i.e., the regions' domestic courts.
And, I know of no systematized program yet in place for transferring
technical or legal experience from the Tribunal to national courts or for
training national judges, prosecutors, or investigators in war crimes prosecutions. That same former ICTY official concludes:
The possibility that local prosecution of war crimes can be conducted
in a reasonably fair and impartial manner in the former Yugoslavia is
now a very distant prospect indeed. The people of the region will,
therefore, probably not see the many perpetrators who were not sent
to the Hague face justice. This is a tragedy that may have been
avoidable. Hopefully, it is a lesson from which the ICC, as well as
other 80international efforts to promote and deliver justice, will
learn.
Finally, sadly, it is not at all clear that the ordinary citizens in the countries where the war crimes were committed have taken away any
messages from the Hague trials that would prevent recurrence when the
next crises occurs or the next ethnic hate campaign is launched. A recent
story in a London newspaper makes the point all too graphically. It concerns the return, 10 years later, of Nusreta Sivac, one of the Omarska
trial's rape victim witnesses, to Prijedor:
[T]he only memorials are large cruciform monuments to the Serb
"liberators" of Prijedor-those who drove out and murdered its nonSerb inhabitants....
• . . [O]f the 200 who ran the Omarska camp, fewer than 10 have
been arrested. These men still live on the land they "cleansed."
Nusreta knows them. She recognizes their faces and often knows
their names. And as one of the most public survivors and witnesses
of Omarska, they know her. Nusreta has testified in trials at The
78. See, e.g., Should We Let the Death Camps Die?, PARADE MAG., Nov. 20, 2002, at

16 (debating the best way to remember victims of the Holocaust).
79. David Tolbert, The Evolving Architecture of International Law: The International
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF 7 (2002).

80. Id. at 17.
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Hague. She has appeared in television documentaries and newspaper articles.
This summer, Nusreta returned to Prijedor to reclaim the apartment
that was stolen from her when she was taken to Omarska. The flat
was occupied and its contents looted by one of her former colleagues
at the Prijedor courthouse where Nusreta worked as a judge.
...Nusreta says Serb acquaintances, including former friends, turn
their heads when she walks by. She locks her door at night and pulls
the shutters down. In Banja Luka, a hand grenade was thrown into
the home of another returnee.
But Nusreta believes she has no choice but to be here. She has no
home but here, no belongings except her property here which, perversely, she must now buy back from the local authorities even
though it was stolen from her. Having survived what she thought
was a certain death in Omarska, she feels compelled to broadcast her
testimony so those who suffered and died are not forgotten.
. .'And back at Omarska, the grass grows and the sheep graze
around the peaceful red sheds81 where now only memory testifies to
what happened 10 years ago.
Have the war crimes tribunals been worth the candle? Will the lessons
learned from their mistakes as well as their successes be put in practice in
the new International Criminal Court which the United States so bitterly
opposes? Most importantly, will international courts be the well-spring
of significant new developments in humanitarian law in the new century,
or simply relegated to a footnote in history? Your generation will write
the answers-ours has only posed the questions.

81. Felix Blake, Bosnia: Rapists and Murderers Stroll Along Pleasant, Cafg-lined Boulevards, While Those Who Suffered Are Shunned and Intimidated, INDEPENDENT
(LONDON),

Nov. 23, 2002.
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